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Many authors have described and modelled Keynesian effects in a Baby-sitting 
Cooperative (BSC), which has the underlying structure of a single good barter economy. We 
construct a simple model of the BSC economy to explore this issue, and find very surprising 
results. Outcomes depend on agents beliefs about the decision making process of others, as in 
the Keynesian beauty contest. For some structures of beliefs, money is neutral, while for 
others, money can have short and long run effects. The value of money can be high, low, or 
zero, depending purely upon expectational effects. Also, despite the fact that this is a single 
good economy, partial equilibrium supply and demand analysis do not work as expected. Some 
equilibria have excess supply, others have excess demand, and none have a match between 
supply and demand. Furthermore, flexible prices cannot fix this problem. An additional 
paradoxical property is that excessive trading can take place. Even though all trades are done 
with mutual consent, some of them decrease welfare, and banning certain types of trade can 
lead to Pareto improvements. Thus the superficially simple single good barter economy of 
BSC displays some subtle, complex and counter-intuitive properties.    
JEL Classifications: D71, E52 
Keywords:  Monetary Policy, Keynesian Economics, Sunspot Equilibria, 
Neutrality of Money 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Classical economic theory of the time could not explain the Great Depression, nor 
the prolonged high unemployment which followed. Keynes argued that this was the result 
of insufficient aggregate demand, which could be fixed by expansionary monetary policy. 
These ideas became widely accepted, and constituted the basis for monetary policy until 
the 1970’s. Keynesian theories conflict with the neutrality of money, and suggest that 
expansion of money leads to inflation only under full employment. Keynesian theories 
gradually fell out of favour following stagflation resulting from oil price shock in the 
70’s. This led to emergence of alternative macroeconomic theories, as well as a search for 
micro-foundations for Keynesian economics. This paper provides some micro-
foundations for certain Keynesian phenomena in a specialised economy. The model 
provides surprising insights into the nature of these phenomena. 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007 has led to a renewed interest in Keynesian 
theories. In particular, Krugman in “The Return of Depression Economics” argued that 
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Keynesian ideas remain relevant to understanding contemporary recessions. To motivate 
this, he has used a real world example of the Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Cooperative 
(BSC). According to an analysis by economists who were members of the Cooperative, 
the BSC suffered from a recession due to a shortage of “scrip”, the currency used to 
exchange baby-sitting services. 
Krugman’s analysis is based on an intuitive and heuristic analysis by Sweeney and 
Sweeney (1977). However, the BSC is a very simple single good economy, where the 
sole function of money is to allow for inter-temporal trade. This simplicity allows for a 
rigorous analytic treatment. Our research was motivated by the idea of analytically 
validating the intuitive insights of the Sweeneys and Krugman. Is the BSC a Keynesian 
economy? Can a shortfall of money create a recession in this economy? A simple model 
which displays Keynesian effects should be useful in building understanding of these 
phenomenon in more complex situations. Previous analyses of the BSC have come to the 
following conclusions.  
1. In a purely heuristic analysis, Sweeney and Sweeney (1971) argued that the 
BSC is a Keynesian economy—insufficient money leads to recession, while 
excess leads to inflation. Krugman uses the Sweeney arguments without further 
analysis.  
2. With motivation similar to ours, Hens, et al. create a mathematical model for 
the BSC economy. They show that the BSC economy displays Keynesian 
properties. There is an optimum quantity of money, and too little money leads 
to recession. They also conduct an experiment which validates their theory, in 
that the experimental results conform to the theoretical predictions. They 
suggest that the existence of the optimum quantity of money is due to fixed 
prices – one unit of scrip can be exchanged only for one unit of baby-sitting. 
3. With a somewhat different model and motives, the analytical analysis of Kash, 
et al. reaches similar results for the BSC economy. They find that increased 
money supply leads to increased exchange up to a critical limit which is the 
optimal quantity of money. They find a new phenomenon of a “crash”. 
Increasing money supply beyond the optimal quantity leads to zero trade as the 
value of money collapses to zero. Kash, et al. also suggest that the optimal 
quantity is due to fixed price of scrip. 
All authors mention as significant the “fixed price” feature of the BSC economy. 
But in presence of fixed prices, the existence of an optimal quantity of money, and 
recession for low money is a triviality. The Keynesian rejection of neutrality of money is 
not based solely on sticky prices. In this paper, we create a simple model of the BSC 
economy to investigate the presence of Keynesian phenomena. The model leads to 
strange and paradoxical results, not available in earlier analyses. We list these results 
below. 
1. The BSC Economy has the Keynesian Beauty Contest property. That is, 
equilibria depend heavily on the beliefs of agents about how other agents will 
behave. For the sake of definiteness, let us call this “second order expectation”: 
agents’ expectations about the decision making procedures being followed by 
other agents. Different types of 2nd order expectations are possible, and lead to 
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different types of phenomenon. All of the expectation mechanisms explored are 
“rational” in the sense of being self-fulfilling, creating a justification for 
believing in their validity.  
2. The central question being investigated is: is money neutral in the BSC 
economy? This has a subtle, complex and perhaps paradoxical answer. In all 
models, money is “technically” neutral—that is, all levels of money are 
compatible with the same sets of equilibria. This is true even though prices are 
fixed. At the same time, money is not “expectationally” neutral. At any given 
level of money stock, coherent expectations about the value of money will be 
self-fulfilling. In our model, there are three possible coherent and self-fulfilling 
expectations about money: money is of high value, low value, or zero value. 
The quantity of money will fail to be neutral if changes in the stock of money 
affect the expectations about the value of money. If expectations are not 
affected, then changes in quantity of money have no effect on the equilibria and 
money is neutral in short and long run.  
3. A paradoxical violation of Say’s Law: The BSC economy display several other 
phenomena which run counter to standard intuitions. Supply creates its own 
demand in two strong senses. In a single period, supply of baby-sitting is 
jointly produced with demand, and hence supply creates demand. In addition, 
all agents balance budgets across time, so that for any single agent, an act of 
supply is exactly matched by a demand for baby-sitting services at some other 
point of time. Despite this dual guaranteed match between supply and demand, 
some equilibria have excess supply, others have excess demand, and none have 
a match between supply and demand. 
4. Breakdown of Partial Equilibrium Supply and Demand Analysis. This 
phenomenon of mismatch between supply and demand has been noted by many 
authors, and attributed to the fixity of price—one scrip is worth one half-hour 
of babysitting. We show that flexible prices cannot resolve this problem. One 
might expect that the partial equilibrium (PE) Marshallian theory would work 
in a single good economy. However, we will see that supply and demand 
cannot be separated as required by PE analysis, and thus the intuitions 
generated by supply and demand analysis do not hold up.  
5. Excessive Trading is Possible. Intuition suggests that trade by mutual consent 
is always welfare improving, since both parties agree to the trade only under 
this circumstance. Thus, Kash, et al. argue that the volume of trade is a good 
indicator of welfare in the BSC economy. In our model, despite mutual 
consent, trades can be welfare decreasing, and banning certain trades can lead 
to welfare improvements. Equilibria with lower total trading volume can be 
superior to situations with higher trading volumes.  
All of these paradoxical properties suggest that the surface simplicity of the BSC 
Economy is deceptive, and hides deep and murky complexities. Although it would be 
premature to jump to policy implications on the basis of such a simple model, these 
implications are valid for the BSC economy itself, and are radically different from those 
suggested by standard economic intuitions. Two of these implications are highlighted 
below: 
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1. The value of money can change from high to low and to zero depending purely 
upon expectations in the BSC economy. It seems likely that this phenomenon 
will generalise far beyond the simple BSC economy, since multiple equilibria 
driven by expectations are ubiquitous in monetary models; see for example 
Evans and McGough (2005).  Central Bank responses to speculative attacks on 
currencies are guided by the intuition that the value of currencies are 
determined by fundamentals. Thus, speculators cannot win if the fundamentals 
are sound. Many Central Banks have bet heavily and lost heavily against 
speculators on the basis of these intuitions. In the BSC economy, the value of 
money does not depend upon fundamentals, but purely on expectations about 
the value of money. Thus a speculative attack can succeed just by changing 
expectations, without any change in the fundamentals. A subtle and complex 
interaction between fundamentals and the value of money occurs because of 
the nature of expectations. If everyone believes that fundamentals are relevant 
to the value of money, then this becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Speculative 
attacks will then take the shape of news about change in fundamentals, 
regardless of whether or not such change has occurred or whether the changes 
being described in the news actually matter in the determination of the value of 
the currency. As long as the news convinces the public, and changes their 
expectations about the value, the attack will succeed, regardless of Central 
Bank interventions.  This matches empirically the way speculative attacks are 
conducted and has radical implications for policy in face of such attacks. 
2. The Sweeneys and Krugman suggests that low money supply leads to a 
recession in the BSC economy. In our model, this can happen but has radically 
different implications from the ones drawn by these authors. First, the 
expansion of money works through the expectations effect, and so monetary 
problems are not purely technical. They have a social dimension and work 
through consensus about the value of money. Second, even though increased 
money supply may increase the volume of trade, this may actually decrease 
social welfare. Thus, the so-called recession state, with low volume of trade 
and high value of money, may actually be superior in terms of welfare to a high 
volume of trade with low value of money. Again this is in strong conflict with 
standard economic intuitions.    
An important lesson from our model is that choice of a particular equilibrium 
among a multiplicity of Nash Equilibria requires agents to coordinate plans.  The central 
message of Bicchieri (1997) is that we must go beyond individual rationality, and study 
how agents actually learn to resolve the coordination problem. Behavioural economics 
provides us with the possibility of studying such problems, involving how a particular 
Nash equilibrium is chosen. Duffy (2008) has provided an extensive survey of this 
literature. Our research suggests that we need to move beyond individual decision 
making to study collective decision making in problems with multiple Nash equilibria.                                                
 
2.  A MODEL OF A BSC ECONOMY 
The BSC is a single good economy. In each period, agents (families) can either 
produce the good (offer baby-sitting services) or consume it (receive baby-sitting 
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services). Unlike Hens, et al. (2007) and Kash, et al. (2007), we consider a finite horizon 
economy which terminates at a fixed and known endpoint in time. We also assume zero 
discount rate. These simplifying assumptions bring out clearly a core feature of the BSC 
economy which is obscured in the infinite horizon treatments. If prices are fixed in 
monetary terms, then the budget constraint means that the number of goods produced 
must exactly equal the number of goods consumed.  This is valid both cross-sectionally 
and across time. That is, at every point in time, agents who produces services must 
exactly match in number the agents who consume. Also, every family must balance its 
lifetime budget by consuming services exactly equal to its production.  
Assume that all families start out with an initial allocation of M0 units of money. 
Money—also called scrip in this context—must be used to buy services, and is earned by 
offering services. However, on the terminal date T, every family must return the full 
amount of the initial allocation. This means that families must maintain a balanced 
budget over the lifetime of the BSC economy. The initial allocation is only a device to 
allow them to borrow from future earnings. The initial money stock M0 can be made 
arbitrarily large, to prevent any artificial upper limit to this borrowing. Borrowing from 
future is automatically constrained by the maximum lifetime earnings remaining to 
terminal date, which declines to zero as we approach terminal date. 
The basic problem is similar to that of inter-temporal consumption smoothing.  
The utility from consuming and producing babysitting services vary at random with time. 
Families would like to consume when the need is High, and produce when the cost is 
Low. For simplicity, we consider three states of need for babysitting service: Z(ero), 
L(ow), and H(igh).  Families have three actions available: {P(roduce), C(onsume), 
I(dle)}. As a benchmark, we suppose that U(P|Z)=U(C|Z)=U(I|Z)=0; the utilities from 
idling, producing or consuming in state Z are all equal to 0. Also, U(C|H) > U(C|L) > 
0=U(C|Z) while U(P|H) < U(P|L) < 0=U(P|Z); utilities of consuming baby-sitting services 
are ranked High, Low and 0 in states H, L and Z, while costs of providing baby-sitting 
services are in reverse order in these three states.  Key assumptions regarding 
intertemporal swaps for any single agent are as follows:  
 U(C|H)+U(P|H) < U(I|H)+U(I|H) << 0.  Agents do not want to buy services in 
state H if they have to pay for them in state H. They would rather stay idle in 
both states. However, idling in state H, or not having baby-sitting services in a 
situation of high need, is a very poor outcome.   
 U(C|L)+U(P|L) < U(I|L)+U(I|L) < 0. The same is true for state L. Idling in both 
periods is preferable to producing and consuming. 
 U(C|H)+U(P|L) > 0. Consuming services in state H and paying for them in L is 
preferable to staying idle in both states. 
 U(C|H) > U(C|L) > 0 guarantees that agents are happy to buy services in states 
H and L if they can pay for them by selling in state Z.    
To understand the results to follow, it is useful to bring out certain implications of 
our assumptions about the utilities. We will assume that individuals maximise the sum of 
undiscounted expected utilities, to preserve the underlying one-for-one barter structure of 
the trading. Note that expected utilities are cardinal; the actual numbers matter. 
Nonetheless, our results will be valid for a large range of numbers satisfying the 
6 Asad Zaman 
following qualitative considerations. First, it is very important to be able to get baby-
sitting in the high need state: U(C|H) >> 0. We will refer to failure to get service in state 
H as a “crisis”: U(I|H) << 0. Having to provide services in state H is even worse: U(P|H) 
< U(I|H). What happens in state L is of lower order of magnitude in comparison. That is, 
if the utility numbers are in the thousands for state H, they are in tens for state L. It is 
pleasant to get services in state L and an annoyance to provide services in state L. Not 
getting service in state L is a minor nuisance. To a first approximation, the efficiency of 
any system for the baby sitting economy can be gauged in terms of its ability to prevent 
crises. If all high need demands for baby-sitting are fulfilled, then the system is 
functioning efficiently.   All agents like to consume in state H, and to produce in state Z 
to pay for this consumption. Dynamics are driven by what happens in state L.  If agents 
do not get enough income from sales in state Z to satisfy their H(igh) need demands, then 
they will produce in state L to finance consumption in state H. However, if they have 
sufficient income to cover their H demands, they will use the excess income to purchase 
baby-sitting services in state L. Thus in state L, agents can be either producers or 
consumers depending on market conditions.  
Demand and supply depend on randomly generates states of need (H,L,Z) and hence 
need not be equal in any period of time. We assume that market will be cleared via 
randomised rationing, as in Hens, et al. (2007). That is, if there is excess supply, the 
demand will be distributed randomly over the suppliers; some will be chosen to supply, 
while some will remain idle, with identical probabilities for all agents. Excess demand is 
also handled similarly by randomised rationing of available supply. Crucial parameters are 
the probabilities p(B) and p(S) of being able to Buy or Sell baby-sitting services.  If there is 
excess supply, then p(B)=1 while p(S) is the ratio of the number of agents who are 
demanding baby-sitting services to the number of agents who are offering baby-sitting 
services. In cases of excess demand, this is reversed: p(S)=1 while p(B) is the reverse ratio. 
Hens, et al. (2007) and Kash, et al. (2007) both assume that the agents know these 
probabilities. However, neither discusses how the agents might learn these probabilities.   
How agents calculate these probabilities (p(B) and p(S)), which are required for 
rational decision making, is central to the operations of the BSC economy. Future 
probabilities cannot be calculated solely on the basis of observable variables of aggregate 
demand and supply. Every agent must know how other agents are making these 
calculations in order to arrive at an accurate estimate. This is why second order 
expectations are crucial to rational decision making and equilibria in the BSC economy. 
To demonstrate this, we work with two different models for second order expectations. 
One is an oracular model, while the other is a threshold model. We first describe the 
Oracular expectations model, which is simpler of the two. 
 
3.  ORACULAR EXPECTATIONS 
To demonstrate the existence of sunspot equilibria, we assume the existence of a 
Fama-Oracle which forecasts the probabilities p(S) and p(B). As long as all agents 
believe in the Fama-Oracle, these forecasts always turn out to be accurate and therefore 
create rational expectations.  
We assume that the Fama-oracle announces the probabilities p(B) and p(S), and 
that it is common knowledge that everyone believes in the Fama-oracle. Note that this is 
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an assumption about a particular structure of second order expectations. In addition, 
decisions require knowledge of the probabilities p(Z), p(L) and p(H) of the states Z, L 
and H. We assume that these three probabilities are known to all and the same for all 
agents, as well as across time. We also assume that nature generates these states in such a 
way that the actual proportion of the states Z,L,H across agents is exactly equal to the 
these three probabilities. Furthermore, over the lifetime of an agent, the actual frequency 
of occurrence of the three states is also matched to the theoretical probabilities of each of 
the three states Z, L and H. This assumption simplifies calculations and avoids peripheral 
complications, without affecting the central results. 
Knowledge of these five probabilities (p(B),p(S),P(H),p(L),p(Z)) allows us to 
compute the agents’ maximising strategies. We assume that p(H)< ½ and also p(Z) < ½. 
These inequalities imply that p(H)< p(Z)+p(L) and also p(H)+p(L) > p(Z).  
 
3.1.  Three Rational Expectations Equilibria 
We will now show that the Fama-oracle can create three rational expectations 
equilibria. 
Excess Supply Equilibrium (High Value of Money):  Assume the oracle 
announces that for the foreseeable future there will be excess supply so that probability of 
being able to buy baby-sitting is unity: p(B)=1. Sellers will be rationed, with p(S) = p(H) 
/ [p(L)+p(Z)].  This will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Scrip has high value in this 
equilibrium in the sense that owners of scrip are guaranteed to be able to buy baby-sitting 
services 
Excess Demand Equilibrium (Low Value of Money):  Assume the oracle 
announces that for the foreseeable future there will be excess demand, so that p(S)=1. 
Demanders will be rationed, and will succeed in buying with probability p(B)=p(Z)/ 
[p(H)+p(L)]. This will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Scrip has lower value in this scenario 
since owners of scrip can buy baby-sitting services only with probability p(B)<1. 
Zero-Trade Equilibrium (Zero Value of Money): If the Fama-Oracle announces 
that the Gods are angry, and the value of money will be zero from now on, this too will 
be a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this case p(B)=p(S)=0, and no one can buy or sell baby-
sitting services.  
Proofs: The Zero-Trade Equilibrium is trivial. The other two cases can be proven 
as follows:  
Excess Supply Equilibrium. Suppose the oracle announces that p(B)=1, and p(S)= 
p(H)/[p(L)+p(Z)] < 1. Then all agents maximise lifetime utility by always buying 
services in state H, and by always offering to sell in states L and Z.  
Proof: To a first order approximation, agents maximise lifetime utility by avoiding 
crises. So we start by assuming that all agents always demand baby-sitting services in 
state H. To finance these purchases requires an income of p(H)xT; the proportion of time 
agents are in state H, times the total time horizon T.  Agents maximise lifetime income by 
always offering to sell in states L and Z. This generates income equal to p(S)  [p(L) + 
p(Z)] x T because offers to sell are completed with probability p(S). This is exactly equal 
to p(H) x T, the income needed to purchase services in state H. Agents generate 
maximum possible income, which is exactly enough to meet their high priority demands 
for baby sitting—no crises. Any change in any decision (offers to buy or sell) will result 
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in crises, either because of failure to request services in state H, or insufficient budget to 
buy services.  
Excess Demand Equilibrium: Suppose p(S)=1, and p(B)=p(Z)/[p(H)+p(L)]  < 1. 
Then all agents maximise lifetime utility by always offering services in state Z, and 
always requesting services in states H and L.  
Proof: Agents always succeed in selling in state Z, so their lifetime income is p(Z). 
Income needed to purchase their lifetime demand of services in states L and H is p(B) x 
[p(H)+p(L)] = p(Z). Offering services in state Z is always optimal. Since this creates 
exactly enough income to allow them to request services in all states L and H, this is 
necessarily an optimal sequence of decisions. Failure to request services will result in 
surplus, unutilised income.    
Technical Note: We take a large finite T, and ignore complications that would 
arise near the terminal date. Our treatment can be made rigorous by using a limit process 
as both the number of agents N, and the time period T approaches infinity.  This would 
be a formalisation of the Ramsey-Weizsacker overtaking criterion. There are many other 
ways to resolve the problem, but our main results are robust to minor changes in how we 
handle the complications near the terminal date.  Our treatment provides conceptual 
clarity with a minimum of mathematics.     
Discussion: Note that the quantity of money is irrelevant in these equilibria, as 
long as M0 is sufficiently large to prevent constraints on borrowing from the future. 
Another option is to allow agents to borrow from each other, or from the central 
authority. In either case, the quantity of money will be irrelevant to short run and long run 
equilibrium. Thus, contrary to the analyses of earlier authors, there is no optimum 
quantity of money in the BSC model under Oracular Expectations. However, we can 
create monetary effects if we link oracular forecasts to the money supply. First, we give 
an example to illustrate how rational expectations can create an illusion of causality 
between money and economic outcomes.  
Suppose that the Fama oracle announces that there will be excess supply on days 
when the Air Quality Index (AQI) is above 50, and excess demand when AQI is less than 
50—it appears perfectly plausible that people would want to go out when the pollution 
index is low, and to stay home otherwise. Under our model assumptions, this would also 
create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, people could come to believe, based on solid 
empirical evidence, that the AQI has a causal effect on demand and supply of baby-
sitting when in fact it has zero effect. To be more precise, the causal effect is created by 
the belief in the existence of the effect (via the Fama-Oracle intervention).  
Similarly, if the Fama-Oracle announces that there will be excess supply if 
aggregate money stock (known to all) is greater than some threshold M*, and excess 
demand when it is less, this too will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus monetary effects 
can be created if the Fama-Oracle chooses to create them.  
 
4.  THRESHOLD EXPECTATIONS 
Both Hens, et al. (2007) and Kash, et al. (2007) study equilibria in threshold 
strategies, which is a different assumption about how agents behave in response to 
changes in money stock. To show that the BSC economy has the Beauty Contest 
property, we now study this alternative assumption about second order expectations. To 
 Monetary Paradoxes of Baby-Sitting Cooperatives  9 
get the desired equilibria, it must be common knowledge that all agents behave using the 
strategies described below.  
 
4.1.  Threshold Strategies 
Kash, et al. (2007) and Hens, et al. (2007) find Nash equilibria such that agents 
play threshold strategies. In our model, we can characterise such strategies as follows. 
Agents in state H always offer to buy, while agents in state Z always offer to sell. 
Suppose an agent holds a stock of money M. In state L, there exists threshold values M** 
and M* such that agents buy if M > M** and sell if M< M*. Between the two value, 
agents stay idle. If it is common knowledge that all agents play the same threshold 
strategy, then the agents can co-ordinate their beliefs about what will happen.  
Let m(a,t) be the money endowment of agent a at time t. In going from time period 
t to t+1, the sellers’ stocks will increase by 1, buyers’ stocks will decrease by 1, and those 
who stay out of the market will remain at the same level. These transition probabilities 
create a Markov chain which has a limiting stationary distribution, exactly as 
demonstrated by both Hens, et al. (2007) and Kash, et al. (2007). Thus, for sufficiently 
large values of t, there exist probabilities p*(j) for j=0,1,2,... such that agents have money 
stock m(a,t)=j with probability p*(j). These lead to three stable probabilities p(BS), 
p(BB) and p(BD) of budget surplus (m(a,t) > M**), budget balance (M**  m(a,t)  M*), 
and budget deficit ( m(a,t) < M* ): 




𝑗>𝑀∗∗    
Once the Markov chain reaches stationarity, the proportion of buyers is 
p(H)+p(BS) p(L), while the proportion of sellers is p(Z) + p(BD) p(L). We ignore the 
initial period required for the Markov chain to reach stationarity, and calculate equilibria 
under the assumption of stationarity—this corresponds to the analysis of Hens and Kash, 
et al. who assume that the game starts in an equilibrium position. There is no harm in this 
assumption, since we are just illustrating some phenomena which would occur near the 
middle of the game.   We will now show that the Nash equilibria of the threshold 
economy are the same as those of the oracular economy.  
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, all agents in state L must play the same strategy – 
either buy or sell. Both of these possibilities form Nash equilibria, which are the same as 
the excess supply and excess demand equilibria of the Oracular economy. 
Proof: First consider a case where every agent can be in Surplus or in Deficit with 
positive probability: p(BS)>0 and p(BD)>0. With these values for M* and M**, all 
agents will find themselves on both sides of the market in state L during their lifetime. 
This is because the Markov chain is irreducible, and all states can be reached from all 
other states. Thus any agent can gain by adjusting the thresholds M* and M** in such a 
way that one of these two probabilities is reduced to zero. This will eliminate 
intertemporal swaps of buying and selling in state L, leading to improved welfare. This 
means that values of M* and M** which lead to p(BS)>0 and p(BD)>0 cannot represent 
an equilibrium. 
Next suppose the thresholds M* and M**  are such that probability of budget 
surplus or balance are positive (p(BS)>0 and p(BB)>0) but there is no probability of a 
deficit: p(BD)=0. If a single agent shifts thresholds to make p(BB) smaller and p(BS) 
10 Asad Zaman 
larger, she will benefit from this adjustment. The actions of a single agent do not affect 
the aggregate probabilities p(B) and P(S) of purchase and sale, so she will be able to buy 
additional services in state L, improving her payoff. If all agents make these adjustments, 
the stable point of this adjustment process will be p(BS)=1 and p(BB)=p(BD)=0, which is 
the excess supply equilibrium. A similar arguments shows that p(BS)=p(BB)=0 while 
p(BD)=1 also leads to equilibrium.  
 
4.2.  Interpretation of Rational Expectations Equilibria 
Many authors interpret threshold strategies as follows. Agents seek to have a 
minimal level of reserves, to provide them with a cushion against a sequence of 
unanticipated high priority needs. This interpretation is also supported by the actual 
experiences of the baby sitting cooperative as well as experimental evidence provided by 
Hens et. al. However, this interpretation is not fully satisfactory. This is because the 
economy as a whole has a fixed amount of money, and savings of one is dissavings of 
another. So as a group, members of the BSC cooperative cannot achieve the goal of 
higher savings. Also, all members play balanced budget strategies. So their money 
holdings form a random walk centred on initial holdings—savings cannot increase 
systematically. The goal of increasing reserves is an illusion, both individually and 
collectively. How can we expect high levels of rationality and maximisation from our 
agents, if they fail to realise something as simple as this? 
The sunspot interpretations provide an explanation. If one agent is a skeptic, but 
thinks that others will believe the oracle, then it is still optimal for her to follow the Nash 
strategy. As discussed, the equilibrium has properties of the “beauty-contest”. Even if all 
agents are skeptics, but consider that other agents will compute strategies under the 
assumption that all others are believers, the same Nash equilibrium will result. In exactly 
the same way, agents can co-ordinate on threshold strategies without believing that these 
are good strategies, if they think that everyone else will be reasoning in this way. Hens, et 
al. (2007) provide experimental evidence to suggest that subject do in fact follow 
threshold strategies, which would partly explain the experiences of the original baby-
sitting cooperative. 
 
5.  LESSONS FROM THE BSC ECONOMY 
Despite the surface simplicity of a single good, one-for-one barter economy, 
analysis of the BSC economy leads to deep, subtle, and counter-intuitive results. We 
summarise these results, and discuss their implications. 
 
5.1.  The Neutrality of Money 
What comes out very clearly from the analysis of the BSC economy is that money 
is at least partly a “social construct”. It derives value from our mutual agreement about its 
value. Thinking about the Fama-oracle as a mechanism to arrive at consensus, money 
have can have high, low or zero value according to our mutual agreement on one of these 
values. At the same time, money is not purely a social construct. The underlying 
structures of supply and demand determine the value of money in the two non-trivial 
equilibria. Thus the value of money emerges by the interaction of social norms with the 
economic environment. This seems to be well understood by central bankers and 
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treasuries who use a combination of confidence building measures such as transparency 
together with technical measures such as setting interest rates and open market operations 
to control the value of money.  
Is the BSC a Keynesian economy in the sense that money is not neutral? Our 
analysis shows clearly that the answer is yes and no. If the agents coordinate second order 
expectations on the assumption that money will have high value, then the excess supply 
equilibrium will result. This will not change regardless of how much money there is in 
the system, as long as borrowing is allowed. Thus money will be neutral in short and long 
run.  However, if agents believe that increases in money will be interpreted by other 
agents to imply a decrease in the value of money, then money will fail to be neutral. An 
increase in money supply will lower the value of money, but only because everyone 
believes it will do so.   
 
5.2.  Supply, Demand, and Flexible Prices 
A key lesson from all previous analyses of the BSC economy is that there exists an 
optimal quantity of money in the BSC economy. As we have seen, this result is tied to 
unstated implicit assumptions about second order expectations of the agents. Under 
certain types of second order expectations, money is neutral, while under others it is not. 
In fact, failure of neutrality is surprising in standard models which are homogenous in 
money and prices.  If a certain set of prices and money stocks (p*, m*) leads to efficient 
outcomes, then (p*, m*) will also lead to the same efficient outcomes, for any positive 
scale factor . As long as prices are flexible, there can be no optimum quantity of money. 
This is why Sweeney & Sweeney (1977) and other authors have argued that it is fixed 
prices which lead to shortages and rationing. A system of flexible prices would lead to 
clearing of markets, and to non-existence of an optimal quantity of money. 
Unfortunately, in our BSC model, this does not work as expected. For the sake 
of clarity, consider a specific case where p(Z)=p(L)=p(H) = 1/3. All three states are 
equally likely. Consider the excess demand equilibrium in which all agents in states Z 
are sellers and all agents in states L and H are buyers. In principle, we should be able to 
fix the problem by raising the price of baby-sitting to reduce excess demand. Consider 
therefore doubling the price—the cost of baby-sitting is two units of scrip. Those who 
are buying must pay two units, while those who are selling will receive two units of 
scrip.  Now note that every agent is on both sides of the market at different points in 
time. Today as buyers, they have to pay double, but tomorrow as sellers, they will 
receive double price. So the budget constraint does not change. An agent will pay two 
units in when he is a successful buyer in states H and L, and receive 2 x 1/3 in the state 
Z. Agents still have balanced budgets and therefore the excess demand will persist at 
any scrip price. 
Our intuition for the idea that price flexibility would resolve mismatch of supply 
and demand is generated by the Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis. One would 
expect that the partial equilibrium analysis would work in a single good economy. 
However, the analysis fails because supply and demand are entangled. Since agents are 
both suppliers and demanders, a price rise affects both sides simultaneously. Lower 
demand due to increased prices is exactly offset by the rise in demand due to higher 
income.       
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Instead of nominal prices in scrip, we could consider changing the real price of 
baby-sitting. Now those who buy one unit of baby-sitting services must pay for it by 
offering two units. Now the agents will plan to buy in state H and sell in states L and Z. If 
there is no rationing, then these plans would go through. That is, agents can finance the 
purchases in 1/3 cases of H, by paying in 2/3 cases of L and Z. However, there is now 
excess supply and the probability of sale will be only ½,  so agents will actually foresee a 
budget deficit. This is a general feature of the  BSC economy. The technology is such that 
in any period of time, sales and purchases occur in pairs, one for one, and must match 
exactly. Also, across time, every agent must match every sale with a purchase on a 1:1 
basis. Thus real prices are technologically fixed and cannot be varied.  
 
5.3.  A Paradoxical Violation of Say’s Law 
Krugman (2011) argues that the BSC economy demonstrates a violation of Say’s 
Law. We note here how surprising and paradoxical this is. This is because this is one 
model in which we could attach strong expectations to the validity of Say’s Law. The 
technology of baby-sitting is such that every good produced is automatically matched 
with a consumer – baby-sitting is a two sided transaction. Supply cannot be produced 
without demand. Furthermore all agents balance their budgets, paying for every unit 
consumed by one unit produced. Thus every act of supplying babysitting is exactly offset 
by a demand for babysitting at some other point in time. The logic of Say’s law, that 
production creates its own demand, holds within every time period, and for every agent 
across time periods.  If there ever was a model in which Say’s Law holds, then this would 
be it. However, as we have seen, one of the oracular equilibria of this economy has 
excess supply, in violation of Say’s Law. The other one has excess demand, and there are 
no equilibria where the two are balanced. 
 
5.4.  Efficiency Considerations 
The no-trade equilibrium is, of course, highly inefficient. It can easily be seen that 
both of the non-trivial sunspot equilibria are also inefficient. Of the two, excess supply is 
usually better because all high priority demands are fulfilled; there are no crises. The 
inefficiency arises because the supply is proportionally split between low cost and zero 
cost producers, L and Z.  It would be more efficient to have all production done by zero 
cost producers, with L producers only producing as much as minimally required to fulfil 
High Priority demands. Here an intervention which bans L producers from selling 
services could lead to greater efficiency. This is worth examining in detail because of its 
paradoxical implication that banning a trade done by mutual consent leads to improved 
welfare for all participants. We will show below that either of the two equilibria – excess 
demand or excess supply—may be more efficient than the other. 
First, consider a situation where p(H)= 20% p(L)= 50% p(Z)= 30%. In the excess 
supply equilibrium, agents in states L and Z offer babysitting services and their offers are 
accepted with probability 25 percent. In order to pay for their demands in the H state, 
agents must offer services in both L and Z states to generate sufficient income. Money 
has value 1, and all high priority demands are fulfilled, so there are no crises. For 
simplicity, assume there are 100 traders. Then there are 20 trades of baby sitting services 
in each period. Next consider the excess demand equilibrium. Agents in state Z offer 
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services and are guaranteed to find a buyer. Agents in states H and L demand services 
and find a seller with probability 3/7.  There are 30 trades each period, but less than 50 
percent of high priority needs for baby sitting are fulfilled and there are large numbers of 
crises. Thus, we have a high volume of trade (30 trades instead of 20) but lower 
efficiency.  Total cost free supply of baby sitting is 30, and an ideal solution would 
involve providing 20 to those in state H, and distributing the 10 remaining at random over 
the 50 agents in state L. Implementing such a solution via an anonymous market 
mechanism is impossible when the states are not observable. However, social 
mechanisms involving self-assessment and honest revelations of needs might work. In 
this example, excess supply is better than excess demand in terms of welfare. However 
the opposite may be true for other configurations. 
For example, suppose that p(H)=20%, p(L)=30% and p(Z)=50%. In the excess 
supply equilibrium, 80 percent of the agents in states L and Z will offer baby sitting. 
These offers will be accepted with probability 25 percent so that one unit of credit will be 
earned every four periods. This will be just enough to pay for babysitting needs in the 
High Demand state which occurs once every five periods. There will be no crises, but all 
Low priority demands will remain unfulfilled while there will remain many zero cost 
suppliers who are unable to find buyers. The excess demand equilibrium is much better. 
In this case, the 50 percent of agents in states H and L will demand services, which will 
be exactly met by the zero cost supply from agents in state Z. By coincidence, the 
demand and supply are perfectly matched and there is no excess demand, as there would 
be if p(H)+p(L) was slightly greater than 50 percent.  
 
6.  EXPLAINING THE EXPERIENCES OF THE  
BABY SITTING COOPERATIVE 
Understanding an implicit coordination process requires explicit modelling of the 
learning process followed by agents to arrive at an equilibrium. We suggest one such 
model which could explain the experiences of the baby sitting cooperative, as described 
by Sweeney and Sweeney (1971). Assume the p(H)=25%, p(L)=50% and p(Z)=25%, for 
the sake of concreteness. All agents start out with initial scrip endowment of 10 units. 
They all arbitrarily choose thresholds M** and M* which lead to certain overall 
probabilities p(BS),p(BB) and P(BD) for the group as a whole. These probabilities 
determine the supply and demand of babysitting services at arbitrary initial levels. 
Suppose that these arbitrary initial choices lead to 20 percent of agents in state L being 
sellers, 20 percent being buyers and 10 percent remaining idle.  Then overall demand is 
45 percent which is balanced by overall supply of 45 percent, while 10 percent of the 
families remain idle. Inefficiency is caused by the fact that agents in state L are both 
buyers and sellers – all utilities would improve if they would just stay out of the market.  
What are the signals that agents receive that they can do better, and cause them to 
adjust strategies towards equilibrium? The buyers are buying in state L because they 
perceive themselves as rich relative to an arbitrarily chosen threshold M** – they think 
they have enough credit to be able to buy services in both states H and L. The sellers 
have set a high threshold M*, and perceive themselves as poor: they don’t having enough 
credit to pay for potential crises, and are accumulating money. Attitudes towards risk 
would have a strong impact on these initial choices of thresholds. Since states Z and H 
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cancel in terms of monetary change, the buyers will decumulate money once every 5 
periods (20 percent probability) and sellers will accumulate money with the same 
frequency. Assume M**=M* for simplicity. Then some buyers will transition to poverty 
and will become sellers. At the same time some sellers will transition to richness will 
become buyers. This state of affairs could persist for quite some time.  
Assume that a psychological shock is generated by a crisis. As the random walk in 
money holdings takes some proportion of agents close to 0, they realise that they should hold 
more money in reserve to prevent crises and switch to a higher threshold M*. These agents 
will now become sellers in state L.  As this process continues, the proportion of sellers will 
rise and the proportion of buyers will decline. Starting from a balanced supply and demand, it 
will move to a position of excess supply. To determine suitable threshold levels, an agent 
could calculate as follows. My high priority needs in the next 100 periods are 25 percent of 
100 = 25. My maximum revenues in the next 100 periods will be p(S) x [p(L)+p(Z)] x 100 = 
p(S) x 75. In initial periods of the economy when demand and supply were balanced, agents 
were quite safe. When p(S)=1, they have earning capacities of 75, and high priority demand 
for only 25. However, as some agents experience crises and become sellers only in state L, the 
probability p(S) will start declining, leading to loss of potential income—when p(S) is 50 
percent then the maximum potential earnings is reduced to 37.5 from 75. This will again 
induce agents to increase thresholds to a higher safe level. This adjustment process will 
terminate when all agents become sellers with 100 percent probability in state L. In this case 
p(S)=1/3 which leads to an exactly balanced budget from 75 offers to sell and 25 offers to 
buy. Now we have a steady state equilibrium in which the supply is three times that of 
demand. Economists consider that the economy has fallen into recession. In fact, as we have 
seen, this is a good equilibrium in that there are no crises. Nearly all high priority needs are 
being met. A small proportion of agents will run out of money and will experience crises, but 
this problem can be solved by extending them credit.   
What happens when money is injected into this economy? To answer the question, 
we must posit a model for how agents form expectations about the behaviour of others. If 
for example agents believe that nothing has changed, then nothing will change, because 
everyone is at a stable Nash equilibrium, maximising utility subject to a budget 
constraint. However, change can happen if agents reason as follows. Now I have enough 
money reserves that I need not fear a crisis. I no longer need to sell services in state L, I 
can choose to buy instead, raising my welfare. As this type of thinking diffuses through 
the agents, demand will increase, supply will fall and p(S) will start rising. At some point, 
it will reach back to p(S)=1, when half of the agent in L are rich and the other half are 
poor. Note that richness and poverty is a state of the mind in this story, not an objective 
reality. Also note that as p(S) rises, agents can observe and calculate that their maximum 
potential earnings are increasing and therefore they are becoming richer. This will 
accelerate the process of change. Somewhere in the middle of the transition from excess 
supply to excess demand, there will occur a “golden age” where demand and supply are 
perfectly balanced, and the volume of trade is at a maximum. However the process will 
inexorably continue on past this point and go on to the excess demand equilibrium. How 
long the transition takes depends on details about how agents adjust expectation in 
changing circumstances.  Economists will interpret the excess demand as being due to 
over-supply of money. This story corresponds closely to the one narrated by the 
Sweeneys of the actual experience of the baby sitting economy.  
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7.  IMPLICIT VERSUS EXPLICIT COORDINATION 
Economists who have analysed the recession in the BSC economy have poked fun 
at lawyers who attempted to motivate families to go out more often. The lawyers were 
trying to find a social solution to what was apparently a purely technical monetary 
problem. Our analysis shows that the failure of lawyers was their lack of persuasiveness 
(Capitol Hill credibility gap?), and not a wrong approach. The standard approach used in 
theoretical and experimental economics relies on implicit co-ordination. Making iterative 
adjustments to optimal responses mimics a natural learning process of implicit 
coordination. In presence of multiple equilibria, the outcome depends on arbitrarily 
chosen initial values. As in the “continental divide” game (see Camerer, 2011),  Section 
1.2.2), small changes in initial conditions can lead to large differences in outcomes. 
However, once the equilibrium is reached, it will be “sticky”—it will require group effort 
to change it, since no individual can benefit from shifting from the Nash equilibrium 
strategy.  
An explicit coordination process would involve all the members of the group 
sitting together to achieve consensus on a common desired outcome. When this is 
possible, it is clearly more rational to make a conscious choice of a particular 
equilibrium, rather than letting it be determined by some arbitrary initial choices, 
coupled with default assumptions about decision making strategies of members of the 
group. In this context, it is important to note that groups can often achieve consensus 
on outcomes which are not Nash Equilibria—for instance on the strategy of 100 
percent cooperation in the prisoners dilemma. The standard analysis of games is 
based on Savage’s small world assumption, which studies each problem in isolation. 
In a community where there is substantial interaction outside of any particular game, 
this assumption does not hold. A reputation for honesty, and for fulfilling 
commitments is extremely valuable, and lack of it is extremely harmful in many 
social interactions. Thus human beings routinely fulfil commitments, even at 
personal cost, contrary to game theoretic assumptions based on studying the game in 
isolation as the sole venue of interaction. Once these habits of character are acquired, 
they are adhered to even in situations of interactions with complete strangers, not 
belonging to the original community.  This means that “cheap talk” can achieve 
cooperative outcomes even when these are not based on individually maximising 
strategies. A summary of literature on cooperation by Dawes and Thaler (1988) states 
that “... the analytically uncomfortable (though humanly gratifying) fact remains: 
from the most primitive to the most advanced societies, a higher degree of 
cooperation takes place than can be explained … (by selfishness)”.  
 
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have already discussed how lessons derived from our model of the BSC 
model conflict with many of those drawn by other authors. Our model sets up the 
BSC economy as a single good economy which is bartered across time. Money does 
not play any real role except as an accounting device. As long as agents can borrow 
against future earnings, the quantity of money and monetary policy are irrelevant. 
Also, because of the 1:1 nature of the barter, price flexibility makes no difference to 
the outcomes.  
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A deeper lesson is the following. In models involving trades over time, it is crucial to 
model expectations regarding the future. Failure to model expectations means leaving an 
essential element of the model unspecified. Our BSC model illustrate what Bicchieri (2012) 
has argued at book length; that rationality assumptions are not enough to achieve co-
ordination. Rather, we must consider how agents learn about each other, and how they arrive 
at a co-ordinated equilibrium. The invisible hand paradigm, taken as a fundamental organising 
principle, suggests that a suitable system of prices will efficiently de-centralise decisions. 
Agents need only consider their own separate optimisation problem, and this will produce 
optimal social results. However, in cases of multiple equilibria, this insight is not valid. 
Rather, the agents must cooperate and agree upon a solution which is beneficial to all. This 
can be done implicitly, via the iterative choices of best response Nash strategies. However the 
resulting equilibria can be highly inefficient, and can vary dramatically depending on arbitrary 
initial points. It will be better to co-ordinate strategies and beliefs explicitly, after considering 
the relative efficiency of different choices. Efforts at explicit coordination may involve 
designing institutions and invoking or creating appropriate social norms, which is a different 
paradigm from the standard individual utility maximisation in isolation. 
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